I might be inclined to agree that there is a problem, if it were possible to figure out what is meant by the term professionalism. In ordinary usage, the word can be understood as synonymous with (1) competent performance or perhaps aspirational standards of excellence that go beyond a minimum level of competency ("the painter did a really professional job on our bathroom"); (2) civility ("that lawyer's tirade in the courtroom reveals an unprofessional attitude"); or (3) doing something for a living as opposed to as a hobby ("my colleague plays violin as well as many professionals"). The term gains additional senses in academic discourse, including most notably in the sociology of the professions, which seeks to understand how professions differ from other occupational groups. In this literature, professionalism is a site of 6 contesting claims to authority and conceptions of legitimacy, asserted by the state, occupational groups, and society as a whole. To say that lawyers are professionals in this sense is to say, for example, that they should be entitled to the privilege of self-regulation and independence from the state. Similarly, to dispute the claim of professionalism in the sociological sense may be to critique the monopoly rents enjoyed by lawyers and to argue for greater competition and more attention to the interests of clients.
The result of this multiplicity of meanings is that people who argue back and forth about professionalism are often failing to engage in a serious debate. This is unfortunate, because there are many potential problems with lawyers' practices, potentially going under the banner of "professionalism," which might need to be addressed by courts, educators, or professional associations of lawyers. In practical terms, these problems may be amenable to very different solutions, however, and the inability of lawyers, judges, and scholars to agree on the meaning of professionalism hampers any effective response. More theoretically, the lack of definitional clarity on the surface may obscure underlying political issues which are really driving the debate.
For example, if one takes the position (associated with scholars like Larson and Abel) that the claim to being a profession is essential a way to exclude competition from other occupational groups, monopolize the production of some service, and thus realize substantial economic rents, then one will be skeptical of attempts to defend the independence of a profession against either market forces or state attempts to regulate in the service of protecting the interests of nonprofessionals. A case study of this kind of conflict is the debate in the United States over Less obviously, this conflict plays out behind the scenes when the organized bar attempts to define norms of good practice (through civility codes, creeds of professionalism, and the like), which can be used by elite lawyers as a weapon against lawyers representing unpopular, less powerful, clients. On the other hand, one might believe that professionalism is a good thing, on See Responding to this difficulty, I have argued at length that the distinctive role of lawyers is to serve as custodians of the law, and ensure that their clients comply with its substantive meaning, rather than regarding law as merely an inconvenient obstacle to be planned around.
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This passage, from Robert Gordon and William Simon, is a good statement of the position that I have defended as the core ethical obligation of lawyers:
[E]ven private lawyers committed to unswerving loyalty to client interests still must assume a quasi-public responsibility for honest observance of the basic rules and procedures of the framework, even in the face of the many opportunities they have to ignore the rules with impunity.
14 Complying with this ethical obligation means not advising clients on the basis of strained readings of the applicable law, and not seeing one's task as a lawyer as figuring out ways to get For the purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to assume, without providing a fully worked-out 15 argument, that there is a difference between a legitimate and an artificial or distorted interpretation of the applicable law. I should also note that the ethical problems I am concerned with here arise for lawyers acting in a counseling or advising capacity, not representing clients in litigated matters. Lawyers are permitted to take more creative or aggressive positions with respect to the law in litigation, and rely on opposing counsel and the presence of a neutral tribunal to ensure compliance with the law. 6 around legal prohibitions. In my view, there is an attitude we may call "professionalism" which 15 is associated with this ethical ideal. Professionalism accordingly has two components. First, there is a skill or distinctive expertise associated with the craft of interpreting and applying the law to client problems. This distinctive skill is the exercise of reflective judgment, and it is perhaps the central distinguishing feature of what is often called "thinking like a lawyer."
Second, there is a motivation or disposition to comply with the ethical duty. Lawyers may know what a fair and reasonable interpretation of the applicable law is, but may nevertheless be susceptible to pressure from a powerful client to provide a legal opinion that reflects a distorted reading of the law. Professionalism education must address both of these components.
The principal claim of this paper is that education at both the law school and postgraduation stage can plausibly address the first component but not the second. Legal analysis is a craft, and lawyers can become better at it through training and experience. Lifelong learning programs may contribute to this ongoing process of skills development. On the other hand, dispositions and motivations are not only difficult to inculcate through education, but are susceptible to being influenced -decisively, in some cases -by situational factors beyond the reach of educators. Thus, a legal ethics scandal such as the participation of Bush administration lawyers in drafting the so-called torture memos may be deemed a failure of professionalism; the legal advice given by the lawyers was deficient in terms of commonly accepted standards of professional craft, but given the talent and sophistication of the lawyers in question, the 16 explanation for this failure is likely some feature of the drafting process, such as the paranoia and secrecy in which national security policy was made in the years following the September 11th attacks. The subsidiary argument in this paper, which may actually be the more controversial point, is that the central aspect of professionalism, with which we as scholars and educators should be concerned, is a matter of the appropriate attitude or orientation lawyers should take toward the law. In order to establish this claim, it will first be necessary to consider some other conceptions of professionalism that have some currency in the American and Canadian literature.
That is the task of the next section of this paper.
II.
Professionalism: A Concept in Search of a Definition.
As noted in the introduction, discussions of professionalism in the United States are often framed around the idea that there is some sort of crisis at hand, which in turn implies that the legal profession is losing sight of some ideal to which it had previously subscribed. The important thing to focus on is not the decline-and-fall narrative, which seems to be a perennial order that the system continue to serve its justified function.
Unfortunately, these arguments are often lacking in a substantial normative foundation, so that they take on an ad hoc, question-begging quality -for any observed problem with lawyers, the solution must be more "professionalism." As a result, the concept of professionalism is so 21 protean that it is difficult to make progress on understanding how it should be taught, inculcated, reinforced, or regulated. The first step in thinking about professionalism education must therefore be definitional clarification. This section considers two of the definitions that have frequently been used in the professionalism debate, and shows why they should not be the aim of continuing professionalism education.
A. From a Calling to a Business.
A perennial theme of the professionalism literature in the U.S. is that the legal profession was once a calling, but has degenerated into merely a profit-oriented business. The Stanley Stanley Commission Report, supra, p. 251.
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Id. at 300. ("Two charges have been leveled against the Wall Street firm: that it served its rich, evil clients rather than the public; and that it perverted the legal profession, turning free, independent craftsmen into workers in factories of law. Both charges were already heard in the late 19th century and have never completely subsided."). 
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The first substantive response to the critique of the legal profession as a mere business is that "business" can be understood as the antonym of a monopoly, and that competitive markets are generally good for consumers. The legal profession in the United States has always devoted significant energy and resources to preventing non-lawyers from poaching on the turf of the bar. 
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In contrast to the situation in Canada, and despite occasional fulminations to the contrary by the 36 organized bar, the American profession is not substantially self-regulating. Grievance and disciplinary procedures established by the states' highest courts do serve as one source of constraint on the activities of lawyers. In many practice settings, such as prosecutors' offices and large law firms, lawyers face an extremely low likelihood of professional discipline. In those and other contexts, the possibility of other legal sanctions, outside the scope of the state bar disciplinary process, is a much more salient concern. These legal constraints include malpractice or breachof-fiduciary duty lawsuits by aggrieved clients, sanctions imposed by tribunals pursuant to their inherent power to regulate the practice of law by lawyers in their courts, and legislation and administrative agency regulations such as a lawyer a reason to believe that if she obtains an advance waiver under the specified conditions, it will be enforced by a court. On the other hand, practical reasoning concerns what we have reasons to do. In the standard account, there must be something present, over and above reasons for belief, to justify the conclusion of practical reasoning that one ought to do such-and-such.
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The source of motivation may be self-interest, altruism, the "moral sentiments," one's desire to be (and be seen as) a person with a certain moral character, and so on. Whatever the motivation, however, it is independent of knowledge that X is the case. Proponents of professionalism education need to explain how that "something else" may be inculcated through their proposed program of instruction.
B. Adversarial Excess and Incivility.
If there is one issue that seems to dominate many discussions of professionalism in the U.S., it is civility. The story of Joe Jamail's cursing at a deposition in Delaware and then 40 laughing at the sanctions imposed by the court ("Don't Joe me, asshole," "I'd rather have a nose on my ass than come back to Delaware for any reason," etc.) has by now become a standard trope in the professionalism literature. However, I tend to agree with those who believe the emphasis 41 on civility is at best a distraction, and at worst antithetical to some of the core values of Kronman's candid admission that practical wisdom is the province of an elite caste. Although any lawyer can aspire to it, and through experience gain a measure of practical wisdom, only the wisest, most virtuous lawyers deserve emulation.
The effect that the gentleman lawyer is supposed to have on law practice can be perceived from Steven Lubet's story of the day Bert Jenner came to the ordinary peoples' court. As Lubet 49 relates the story, he was a legal services lawyer with a specialization in landlord-tenant and consumer debtor cases, practicing in barely contained pandemonium on the eleventh floor of the municipal court building in Chicago. No one was courteous to one another, the judges and court personnel treated poor litigants with undisguised contempt, and the courthouse regulars were far more concerned with pleasing the repeat-player creditors and landlords than ensuring that the defendants had a fair hearing. All this changed one day when Albert Jenner, the former counsel to the Senate Watergate Committee and a name partner in Jenner & Block, with his "stern countenance, ramrod posture, piercing eyes, and signature bow tie" unexpectedly showed up to handle a case.
[T]he entire courtroom suddenly metamorphosed. The muttering plaintiffs' bar fell silent. Clerks began answering inquiries from unrepresented defendants. The judge actually asked questions about the facts and the law. It was as though we were now in a real courtroom where justice, and people, mattered. Furthermore, this effect lasted for the entire day, long after Mr. Jenner left.
Significantly, Jenner was not just any person -he was a gentleman, and his reputation shamed the lawyers and judges around him into living up to their own ideals. The Jenner story seems like an apt illustration of the highest qualities of professionalism.
The problem with equating professionalism with civility and the ethics of gentlemen is that the word "gentleman" is often understood literally. That is not a good thing in light of the bar's long and ugly history of seeking to exclude members of lower-status groups. The elite of the profession have often warned that letting in outsiders will corrupt the morals of the bar. As
Lawrence Friedman observes:
Old-line lawyers were never too happy about the influx of "Celts," Jews, and other undesirables. George T. Strong, writing in his diary in 1874, hailed the idea "In litigation proceedings I will agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time or for waiver of procedural formalities [e.g. service of process] when the legitimate interests of my client will not be adversely affected." Standard B(3).
"In depositions and other proceedings, and in negotiations, I will conduct myself with dignity, avoid making groundless objections and refrain from engaging in acts of rudeness and disrespect." Standard B(8).
"I will not serve motions and pleadings on the other party, or his counsel, at such a time or in such a manner as will unfairly limit the other party's opportunity to respond." Standard B(9).
"In civil matters, I will stipulate to facts as to which there is no genuine dispute." Standard C(9). . . is not to approve or disapprove of the character of his or her client, the cause for which the client seeks the lawyer's assistance, or the avenues provided by the law to achieve that which the client wants to accomplish. The lawyer's task is, instead, to provide that competence which the client lacks and the lawyer, as professional, possesses."). For a strong statement of the view Wasserstrom describes, see Lee Modjeska, "On Teaching Morality to Law Students," 41 J. Leg. Educ. 71 (1991) (disapproving, in hindsight, of his own moral advice to a client not to throw employees out of work on Christmas Eve, and stating that his own professional competence was questionable since he dared suggest that the client's business plan might be morally problematic).
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III. A Substantial Ethical Conception of Professionalism.
The basic theoretical problem when talking about the sociology of the professions is making good on their claim to exercise legitimate authority to regulate the provision of some service. One attempt to ground the legitimate authority of professions is associated with the Weberian tradition in sociology, and relies on a claim to rational, value-free, "scientific" competence over some domain of technical problems. In this conception, the application of technical rationality -that is, figuring out which means to use to achieve an end that is already defined. These problems turn out to be relatively uninteresting, however, particularly in comparison with those in the swamp, in which figuring out how to frame the problem is a question that necessarily precedes the application of technical rationality, and this initial framing question requires the exercise of discretion and judgment. For example, a civil engineer asked to build a road will think in terms of the requirements of technical rationality, and consider factors like soil conditions, stability, and drainage. Deciding whether or where to build a road, however,
implicates "a complex and ill-defined mélange of topographical, financial, economic, environmental, and political factors." Similarly, lawyers who appeal only to their technical 61 expertise as the ground for professional authority are missing the fact that the core ethical problems for lawyers are like the decision whether to build the road -polycentric, ill-defined, messy, and calling for the exercise of something other than technical rationality. Schön's point exactly, that all of the interesting questions in professional ethics are to be found in the swampy lowlands in which problems do not lend themselves to the application of technical solutions. Looking at the problem in this way distinguishes a particular substantive conception of legal ethics and professionalism from the law governing lawyers. Ascertaining the content of the law on any given point is a matter for the high ground, the application of technical rationality.
By contrast, "real ethics" or "ethics beyond the law" is thought to be a matter of judgment that cannot be reduced to an algorithmic decision procedure. Ethical competence (which is to say, practical reasoning) may be said to be a matter of tacit, intuitive knowledge that practitioners can recognize in action, but not necessarily be able to articulate prior to action. One might also 63 observe that the factors in the overall calculus of right conduct are incomparable in some way, resisting reduction to a common metric that would lend itself to technical rationality. Kronman, for example, argues that exercising good judgment with respect to decisions about ends (those in the swampy lowlands) is not a matter of calculating, but depends on the actor's ethical character, specifically the qualities of imagination, sympathy, and detachment.
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Depending on what one hopes to accomplish, continuing legal education (whether mandatory or optional), may be well or poorly suited to that end. As noted previously, there is nothing objectionable about continuing legal education aimed at informing lawyers about new
[T]o deliberate well, one must do more than just survey the alternatives under consideration from an external point of view. One must also make an effort to enter, with appreciative feeling, into the different points of view they represent, while at the same time retaining an attitude of detached neutrality toward them. 66 When a practitioner reflects in and on his practice, the possible objects of his reflection are as varied as the kinds of phenomena before him and the systems of knowing-in-practice which he brings to them. He may reflect on the tacit norms and appreciations which underlie a judgment, or on the strategies and theories implicit in a pattern of behavior. He may reflect on the feeling for a situation which has led him to adopt a particular course of action, on the way in which he has framed the problem he is trying to solve, or on the role he has constructed for himself within a larger institutional context. critique. Attorneys at a firm tend to drift subtly into particular patterns of action, which they then understand in ethical terms, often without knowing that they are absorbing a system of ethical norms. Explicit knowledge is frequently much less important than these tacit understandings of what is expected from professional peers. The result is that lawyers become socialized into a particular conception of good lawyering, and this occurs without much conscious thought and certainly quite apart from the educational efforts of law schools and the organized bar.
IV. Conclusion.
There is an ironic relationship here between conceptions of professionalism and the ability of the organized profession to do anything about perceived problems with considerable pressure to think in a "forward-leaning" way, on the assumption that the September 11th attacks had created a kind of normative watershed. Not surprisingly, the drafting process was dysfunctional with respect to the end of encouraging lawyers to exercise good judgment.
Organizations such as law firms and government agencies can attend to structural features such as reporting relationships and evaluation and compensation mechanisms. This is not as ambitious as affecting the professionalism of the bar as a whole, but it is a start. Thus, perhaps professionalism education should be focused less on inculcating individual dispositions like sympathy and detachment, or creating conditions in which lawyers can practice using professional judgment, and should be more attentive to designing institutional mechanisms to ensure that lawyers have the opportunity to do the right thing, and are not pressured into abandoning their commitment to good lawyering craft.
